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The  architects  of  the  European  Monetary  Union 
(EMU)  face  a  dilemma  in  trying  to  balance  the 
advantages  of decentralized  administration  against the 
dangers  of nationalism.  In this  respect,  the  American 
model  suggests  a  way  to  stabilize  the  EMU  by 
disengaging  it  from  everyday  politics. 
The  map  of  the  twelve  U.S.  Federal  Reserve 
districts  is  an  odd-looking  thing.  Politically  and 
economically  dissimilar  states  are  lumped  together. 
Some  states  are  split  in two.  No  state  is by  itself  a 
Fed  district.  These  boundaries  make  it  difficult  to 
easily  identify  district  interests  in  the  way  one  can 
speak  of  urban  interests  or  Texas  interests  or  Rust 
Belt  interests,  and  this  is precisely  what  is interesting 
and  stabilizing  about  Fed  districts. 
One  state’s  interest  groups  can  easily  organize 
support  for  a pork-barrel  policy  to  benefit  that  state 
at the  expense  of the  rest  of the  country.  Fed  district 
lines,  though,  discourage  beggar-thy-neighbor  politics 
by  scrambling  the  usual  coalitions  constructed  along 
state  lines.  Suppose  a  pressure  group  wished  to 
lobby  the  Cleveland  Fed  for  a policy  detrimental  to 
neighboring  districts  (say,  lax  credit  approval  stan- 
dards  by  Cleveland’s  discount  window). 
The  pressure  group  would  have  to garner  support 
in Ohio,  Pennsylvania,  Kentucky,  and  West  Virginia, 
four  states  with  markedly  different  interests.  Ohio 
lies completely  within  the  Fourth  District,  so a con- 
sensus  there  might  be  attainable.  Half  of  Penn- 
sylvania,  though,  lies  in  the  Philadelphia  Fed’s 
district,  so that  state’s  interest  groups  would  be  hesi- 
tant  to support  a policy  harming  eastern  Pennsylvania 
but  helping  Kentucky,  Ohio,  and  West  Virginia,  as 
well  as  western  Pennsylvania.  Similarly,  half  of 
Kentucky  is in the  St.  Louis  Fed’s  domain.  Few  West 
Virginia  pressure  groups  would  join  the  coalition, 
since  only  a  tiny  piece  of  West  Virginia  is  in 
Cleveland’s  district. 
On  occasion,  however,  a  consensus  can  arise  in 
one  Fed  district,  pitting  it against  the  other  districts. 
For  example,  a  districtwide  recession  can  lead  to 
one-sided  pressures  on that  district’s  Fed  (which  may 
have  a representative  on  the  Federal  Open  Market 
Committee)  to  support  looser  credit  conditions 
nationally.  The  decentralized  Fed,  though,  reduces 
the  frequency  of such  demands  reaching  Washington 
by  requiring  that  such  pressure  must  filter  through 
debate  at  the  district  level  before  it  reaches  the 
Federal  Open  Market  Committee.  This  structure 
slows  down  the  deliberative  process  enough  that 
policymakers  at  the  highest  level  do  not  have  to 
respond  to  every  ephemeral  economic  disturbance. 
So,  decentralization  assures  that  disparate  voices 
will  be  heard,  while  the  jagged  district  boundaries 
assure  that  these  voices  will  be  organized  through 
channels  other  than  the  usual  political  ones  organiz- 
ed  along  state  lines. 
The  Fed’s  ragged  district  lines  offer  powerful 
advice  to  the  budding  European  Monetary  Union  - 
insulate  a  EuroFed  from  nationalistic  pressures  by 
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18  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  JULY/AUGUST  1990 scrambling  its  districts’  borders.  Rename  the 
Bundesbank  the  Frankfurt  EuroFed,  but  let it repre- 
sent  only  part  of Germany  plus  part  of France,  with 
a governing  board  coming  from  both  to  control  any 
tendency  to favor  only  Germany.  Rename  the  Dan- 
marks  Nationalbank  the  Copenhagen  EuroFed,  and 
let it represent  Denmark  plus some  parts  of Germany 
not  under  the  Frankfurt  EuroFed,  and  so  on  with 
all the  other  central  banks. 
In other  words,  design  EuroFed  districts  that  break 
up  nationalistic  pressures  rather  than  exacerbate 
them,  yet  which  still  confer  the  other  benefits  of 
decentralized  administration.  Entangling  member  na- 
tions  at the  district  level  would  also make  secession 
from  the  EMU  an  administrative  nightmare  (like 
unscrambling  an  emu’s  egg,  so  to  speak),  and  that 
would  bolster  confidence  in  the  EMU  on  world 
markets. 
A  glance  at  the  map  shows  that  drawing  twelve 
scrambled  districts  for twelve  countries  is harder  than 
drawing  twelve  scrambled  districts  for  fifty  U.S. 
states.  Some  districts  might  inevitably  have  distinct 
economic  interests.  Undoubtedly,  it would  take  com- 
plex  negotiations  to  design  the  borders  and  the 
regional  EuroFeds’  voting  structures.  Supplemental 
measures  might  be needed  to adequately  insulate  the 
EuroFeds  from  oolitical  logrolling.  Like  the  district 
classes  of  directors  representing,  say,  industry, 
labor,  national  governments,  the  banking  sector, 
etc.  To  prevent  any  one  nation  from  dominating  a 
EuroFed,  each district’s board  could include  members 
from  other  countries  on  a  rotating  basis,  for  ex- 
ample,  giving  the  London  EuroFed  board  a succes- 
sion  of members  from  Greece,  Portugal,  Belgium, 
and  so  on. 
The  goal  is to  insure  that  national  political  coali- 
tions  do  not  easily  or  quickly  translate  into  EMU 
pressure  groups,  making  money  just  one  more  log 
to  roll  (eg,  I’ll  voter  tighter  credit  if  you’ll  vote 
higher  wine  subsidies). 
National  politics  would  certainly  inject  itself  into 
the  process  of  drawing  lines.  For  example,  would 
Britain  allow  Northern  Ireland  to  fall  within  the 
Dublin  District?  As  difficult  as  these  negotiations 
would  be,  scrambling  monetary  boundaries  at  the 
founding  of the  EMU  would  recognize  and  deal  up 
J+VW  with  an  ugly  reality  -  nationalism  has  been 
ripping  European  institutions  apart  for centuries.  The 
point  here  is  that  the  EMU’s  founders  can  choose 
to face  that  reality  now  and  put  it behind  them.  Or, 
they  can  simply  string  the  existing  central  banks 
into  a  loose  confederation,  with  each  bank  repre- 
senting  purely  national  interests.  Then  they  will be 
sure  to face the  reality  every  day as long  as the  union 
survives.  Feds,  EuroFeds  might  be-well-&ved  by  different 
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